RECENT CASES
plicable to a removal statute;3' a decision on this ground would thus have been considerably more effective in preventing state action which discriminates against persons
solely on the ground that they are indigent and non-resident.
Federal Jurisdiction-Inclusion of Future Pension Payments in Computing
Jurisdictional Amount-Judicial Review of Veteran's Pension Award-[Federal].In igig the plaintiff married James Edward Calhoun in New York City and in 1921
was granted an interlocutory decree in a suit in a New Ybrk court to annul the marriage. No final decree was entered, and subsequently the plaintiff and Calhoun cohabited. In 1922 Calhoun married the defendant in Maryland, after which, at different
times, he resided both with her and with the plaintiff. In 1934 Calhoun was rated mentally incompetent and, as a Spanish War veteran, was awarded compensation. The
defendant was appointed his guardian and received the payments from the Veterans'
Administration, and when Calhoun died in I937 she was awarded a widow's pension.
The plaintiff brought an action in the federal district court for a declaratory judgment
that she was the widow of Calhoun on the ground that the New York annulment decree
was not final and hence was inconclusive under New York law and also for an accounting from the defendant for $i,5oo received by her as the alleged widow of Calhoun.
Held, that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim because the determination
of the plaintiff's status as widow is reserved to the state courts, the requisite jurisdictional amount was not involved, and awards of the Veterans' Administration are final
and not subject to judicial review. Calhoun v. Lange.1
Federal courts do not have original jurisdiction in divorce or other proceedings involving domestic relations,2 but they have taken jurisdiction when, as in the present
case, the validity or effect of a divorce decree is collaterally attacked,3 provided that
the diversity and jurisdictional amount requirements are met.
Although the court's reasoning is not clearly expressed, the second ground of the
decision may have been that the pension payments-past and future-were only collaterally involved in the controversy and hence could not be considered in computing
the jurisdictional amount. But this collateral effect doctrine has previously been applied only where plaintiffs have sought to include sums which were recoverable in subsequent proceedings based upon the action before the court.4 A realistic view of the
31Mr.Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Edwards v. California, 62 S. Ct. 164, 169 (1941), quoted
from Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (igoo): "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion,
the right to move from place to place according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." But see
Finch, J., dissenting, In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 436, 28 N.E. (2d) 895, 903 (i94o).

x40 F. Supp. 264 (Md. 194). The plaintiff rested jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship
and the fact that the present reasonably anticipated value of the pension exceeded $3,00o.
'Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
3Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877); Wheelock v. Freiwald, 66 F. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 8th
1933).
4In New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Gay, 145 U S. 123 (1892), the plaintiff sued to
recover on the defendant's notes, secured by a $20,ooo mortgage. Full recovery was denied on
the ground that the interest charged on the loan was usurious. The plaintiff appealed, seeking
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controversy in the instant case indicates clearly that it concerns the pension, and not
merely the status of two women, each of whom claims to be the widow of Calhoun.s
And no subsequent action would be necessary to secure the pension because the defendant could be declared constructive trustee of all pension payments.
The court, assuming that the pension was directly involved, stated that the jurisdictional amount requirement was not satisfied since future payments could not be considered. 6 Federal courts have included future payments in computing jurisdictional
amounts except in those instances where the future payments are uncertain. Thus, in
suits for payments under disability clauses, where the future disability, and consequently the future payments, are uncertain, such payments are not included; 7 but
where the disability is regarded as permanent, 8 or the validity of the entire policy is
challenged9 and the result of the decision is considered conclusive as to future payments, such payments are included. It may be argued that future payments in the instant case are uncertain: the widow may die; she may remarry; or the Veterans' Administrator mayarbitrarily withdraw payments at any time. The first two contingencies have been held by the Supreme Court not to preclude consideration of future payments. In Thompson v. Thompson,o a suit concerning future alimony payments, which
involved the additional uncertainties that the alimony could be modified or halted upon
changed circumstances or the death of the husband, the Court said .that "the future
payments are not in any proper sense contingent or speculative, although they are subject to be increased, decreased or even cut off ....... 1, A novel contingency in'the instant case is the possibility of the arbitrary withdrawal of payments by the Veterans'
Administrator. But this contingency, like those considered in the Thompson case,
to recover the alleged usurious amount, which was $2,500. Under Georgia law, mortgages
associated with a usurious loan were void, and the plaintiff claimed the amount in controversy
was the value of the mortgage, since if the transaction was usurious, the mortgage would be
void. The court held that the mortgage was not in controversy and that only $2,500 was directly involved.
s In Lawrence v. Nelson, 113 Iowa 277, 278, 85 N.W. 84 (i9oi), it was said that the question of who is a man's widow is only a matter of sentiment, and, unless something further is involved, no court will inquire into the matter.
6 In support of this proposition the court cited New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Gay,
145 U.S. 123 (1892), although once it is conceded that the pension is involved it seems clear that
the future payments as well as the past payments are directly in issue.
7 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moyle, 116 F. (2d) 434 (C.C.A. 4 th i94o); Berlin v. Travelers Ins.
Co., i8 F. Supp. 126 (Md. 1937).
8Ballard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., Io9 F. (2d) 388 (C.C.A. 5 th 194o); Mutual Life Ins. Co.
V. Harris, 32 F. Supp. 90 (La. i94o).
9 Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Fortenberry, 98 F. (2d) 570 (C.C.A. Sth
1938); Rydstrom v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 25 F. Supp. 359 (Md. x938). On hardly distinguishable facts, a contrary result had been reached in Wright v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 19 F.
(2d) ii7 (C.C.A. 5 th 1927), aff'd without opinion 276 U.S. 602 (1928), which seems to have
been ignored in the subsequent cases.
'0 226 U.S. 551 (1913); cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers v, Pinkston,
293 U.S. 96 (1934) (future pension payments computed for full jurisdictional amount, no payments having yet accrued).
xThompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 55r, 56o (193).
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should not constitute a decisive bar, since it is to be presumed that the administrator
will act reasonably. Furthermore, there is a considerable body of authority which permits the courts to review arbitrary acts of the administrator.u If judicial review of
such acts may be had, it seems clear that the future payments are sufficiently certain.
As an alternative ground for the decision in the instant case, the court stated that
pension awards of the Veterans' Administration are not subject to judicial review and
that, therefore, the court could not take jurisdiction. It is suggested, however, that
in the cases cited by the court the basis for the refusal to exercise jurisdiction was the
doctrine of governmental immunity to suit.3 All these cases were suits between individuals and the government,74 and as authority they cited only the phrase in the
consent-to-suit statute, which provides that ". ... nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as giving to either the district courts or the Court of Claims jurisdiction
....to hear and determine claims for pensions."is In the instant case the United
States was not a party, and consequently the sovereign's immunity from suit was not
involved. What the plaintiff sought, in effect, was to have the defendant declared a
constructive trustee for the purpose of receiving the pension payments and turning
them over to the plaintiff. Such a judgment would not subject the United States to
any liability.
Nor would such judicial review unduly interfere with the broad discretion granted to
the pension administrator by Sections i and 5 of the Economy Act of 1933. These provisions, not considered by the court in the instant case, provide that a pension may
be paid to the widow, and that "all decisions rendered by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs under the provisions of this title ....shall be final and conclusive on all
questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision.' 6 But a distinction may perhaps be drawn between the acts of granting or withdrawing a pension
and payment to the proper person once the pension has been granted. Consequently,
whether or not a pension will be granted to a widow is a matter solely within the
discretion of the administrator, and his determination should not be subject to review.
Likewise, a pension that has been granted may be withdrawn, and again the courts
should not interfere.'7 But once granted, and before it is withdrawn, such a pension
Note 17 infra.
A clear expression of this doctrine is found in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (U.S.) 497
(1840).
'4 United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (i888); Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet.
(U.S.) 497 (184-); United States v. Schindler, xo Fed. 547 (C.C. N.Y. i88o); United States v.
Scott, 25 Fed. 470 (C.C. Ohio 1885). Also cited was a state decision, Corkum v. Clark, 263
Mass. 378, i6i N.E. 912 (1928), a case involving a factual situation similar to that of the instant case. The court there refused to grant to the plaintiff the pension money but declared
the plaintiff to be the widow of the deceased veteran. In that case, however, the Veterans'
Bureau, refusing to determine the question itself, had suspended payments pending the determination by the Massachusetts court.
is 36 Stat. io93 (1921), 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (20) (1927).
,6
48 Stat. 9 0933), 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, 705 (1940).
'7 In Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221 (1924), and United States v. Williams,
278 U.S. 255 (1929), it was held that decisions of the Director of the Veterans' Bureau were conclusive unless they were wholly dependent upon a question of law or clearly arbitrary or ca12
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should be a matter of private right in the widow. Determination of whether A or B
is the widow of X is a judicial rather than an administrative function, and in consequence mandamus should lie under the ministerial act doctrine of Kendall v. United
States 8 to compel payment of a granted pension to the proper person. This would not
subject the United States to a money judgment since the pension has already been
granted. By the same reasoning, the argument frequently employed, namely, that a
pension is a gratuity, fails. During the continuance of the pension judicial relief cerx
tainly should be allowed to the person who satisfies the statutory requirements 9 but
who is not receiving the payments.
If it be argued that Congress intended the findings of the Veterans' Administration
to be conclusive even as to the person entitled to a pension, once the pension has been
granted, it may be questioned whether the judiciary may constitutionally be excluded
from this function.20

Labor Law-Sherman Anti-Trust Act-Legality of Labor-Employer Conspiracy
in Restraint of Trade--[Federal].-A criminal indictment under the Sherman AntiTrust Act was brought in a federal district court against the defendants for engaging
in a conspiracy to keep out of the East St. Louis market products made by manufacturers in states other than Illinois and to maintain artificially high prices in the local
area. The indictment alleged that the defendants (millwork, kitchen cabinet, and prefabricated house manufacturers doing business in East St. Louis, Illinois, and surrounding territory and the local carpenters' union) entered into an agreement whereby
the manufacturers agreed to employ only members of the labor union and the union
agreed to permit the manufacturers to use the AFL union label on their products and
to work only on materials bearing the label. Prospective purchasers and contractors
engaged in construction work in the East St. Louis area were allegedly warned by the
union that, if materials which did not bear the label were used, all members of the union
pricious. In Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (i934), the Court assumed jurisdiction to
review a determination of the Director of the Veterans' Bureau, citing as authority the Silberschein and Williams cases. Yet one week after the Reynolds case was decided, the Court indicated in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587 (1934), that § 5 of the Economy Act, note 16
supra, removed the qualifications to administrative finality in pension awards or claims that
were expressed in the Silberschein and Williams cases. The Economy Act, however, was in
effect at the time the Reynolds case was-decided. Thus two inconsistent doctrines of the
Supreme Court appear to be available as authority. See United States v. Brownley, 34 F.
Supp. 923, 924 (Md. 194o), where the court which decided the instant case cited the Williams
case as good authority; see also Van Home v. Hines, 122 F. (2d) 207 (App. D.C. 1941), for a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the authority of the Lynch case.
is

12

Pet. (U.S.) 524 (1838).

X"It might also be suggested that the Director of the Veterans' Bureau is authorized to act
only with respect to the person determined by the court to be the widow. Widowhood would
thus be a jurisdictional fact, determination of which must be left to the court. Cf. Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
go See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 917-i9 (1930), for a dis-

cussion of the significance of Article 3 of the Constitution in relation to the problems of legislative limitation of the court's jurisdiction.

